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LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
knowledge that this nation throughout its long history has
been committed preeminently to the high ideal of government
by law, and dedicated to the rights and privileges of the
individual human being as the focus of that law. Now, as in
the past, the legal profession will fulfill its responsibility to
lead the way toward reason and justice.
William T. Gossett
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS: SAFEGUARDS FOR WITNESSES:
THE PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
THE GRAND INQUEST OF THE NATION
1792-1948
The relation of the citizen to the legislative investigation
has often involved grave questions of liberty which are some-
times overlooked or ignored.' The problems of this relation-
ship which concern personal liberty are posed by the power
to compel disclosures, orally or by "search and seizure," and
the legislative immunity from punishment for inflicting verbal
injury upon private citizens.
I
The roots of the power and immunity extend far back into
the history of western society. In considering the earliest
aspects of the subject it is impossible to separate the legis-
lative powers and immunities from executive or judicial pro-
cedures, because there was no branch-theory of government
in the English tradition from which our rules were taken and
modified. The English Parliament was not a self-conscious
1 A recent convention of the American Bar Association presented more than
seventy panel discussions. Not one was concerned with constitutional liberty. Ellis-
ton, The Integrity of Justice Hughes, 189 THE ATLANTiC MONTHLY 73 (April 1952).
See Gossett, Are We Neglecting Constitutional Liberty?, 38 A.B.AJ. 817-8 (1952).
The Association, however, has recently taken a very great interest in this problem.
See 40 A.B.AJ. 3 (1954).
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legislature until the seventeenth century. Hence, in looking
at the earliest practices medieval government must be seen
as a whole.
The medieval government had power to compel disclosures.
This power is found as far back as the earliest written records.
German popular courts, from which Anglo-Saxon custom
came, used sworn witnesses when the oaths of the principals
of a suit were contradictory. The witnesses were not to give
testimony but to swear only to a fact in dispute.2 This system
of the sworn inquest for public purposes was found else-
where on the continent as early as the eighth century, and
was used by the Norman conquerors of England who made
tax assessments based on the sworn testimony of local in-
habitants.3 It was also Anglo-Saxon practice to use sworn
witnesses to report the character of accused persons.4 The
medieval Parliament, as High Court, administered oaths in
the trials of its own members, and imposed oaths on its kings
and their heirs.5
The power to compel disclosure implies the power to punish
for refusal to testify, which is to punish for contempt. The
first instance of a parliamentary punishment for contempt
occured about 1548,6 and the power has been used intermit-
tently ever since. Today each House of Parliament can
punish ". . . to protect its freedom, dignity, and authority
against insult, disregard or violence by resort to its own pro-
cess and not to ordinary courts of law and without having its
process interfered with by those courts." ' The authors of
standard treatises on the modern British government show
2 1 STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, IN ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT 653-54 (6th ed. 1903). An ancient remedy - not now in existence or
advocated - allowed the disgruntled loser of this battle of oaths to challenge the
members of the court to trial by combat.
3 Id. at 298-99.
4 Id. at427.
5 2 Id. at 250 (4th ed. 1906).
6 Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investiga-
tion, 40 HARv. L. REV. 153, 157 (1926).
7 Contempt of Court, 6 ENCYCLOPEFIA BRITANNICA 328-29 (14th ed. 1938).
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no concern for the status of the witness before legislative
committees, which have the usual power to send for persons
and papers.' It is a fact that the treatment of witnesses has
not been a problem in modern English history.
Legislative inquiry in England takes several forms. Most
frequently, questions are asked of the Government by Mem-
bers of the Commons. Another type of inquiry is the "debate
on adjournment," which provides, almost instantaneously,
for full debate on a pressing public issue. The Parliament
also employs standing committees which have a limited
power to amend bills but which rarely call witnesses, since
the ministries supply the necessary expert knowledge.' Ques-
tions in the House, "debate on adjournment," and the stand-
ing committees, taken together, provide continuous scrutiny
of the kinds of public problems which often set American
investigating committees in motion. The Parliament is gentle
with the executive officers. The reason is clear - the ministers
are Members of Parliament.0 It is not so clear why the Parlia-
ment in its committee activities is equally gentle with private
persons. Perhaps, in contrast to American concepts, it is be-
cause the Member of Parliament owes his election more to
his party's record than to his own reputation.1
Since the accession of the Tudor dynasty in 1485 English
witnesses have had much more difficulty with executive offi-
cers than with the Parliament. The phrase "Star Chamber
proceeding" is still a synonym for unfair hearing. The diffi-
culties are even more clearly shown by the history of the
"oath ex officio," which was the practice of questioning sus-
pected heretics under oath. This was standard practice in
England from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, and
reached its highest refinement in the Court of High Com-
8 JENNMGS, PA"ITA1ENT 331 (1939).
9 Finer, The British System, 18 U. or Ci. L. Rxv. 521, 526-38 (1951).
10 Id. at 569-70.
11 Shils, The Legislator and His Environment, 18 U. oF Cnx. L. Rav. 571, 572
(1951), explains the individualism of the American Congressman.
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mission under Queen Elizabeth I. The Court of High Com-
mission used a set list of questions which were deliberately
phrased so as to incriminate the witness and his fellow of-
fenders, if possible. The practice was abolished during the
English Civil War. An opponent of the Court of High Com-
mission said in the Parliament that: ". . . theire Courte shall
never want worke as long as a Promoter hath an ill tongue, or
a Knave can slander an honest man... ." The prohibition of
compulsory self-incrimination was firmly fixed in English law
by the end of the seventeenth century, and led directly to the
writing and ratification of the Fifth Amendment to the Uni-
ted States Constitution.12
Outside of Great Britain, but in the same legal tradition,
there is an Australian precedent relevant to the limits of leg-
islative inquiry and compulsory disclosure. The Privy Coun-
cil of Great Britain, in 1914, denied the power of the Austral-
ian Parliament "to compel disclosures of matters not within
the scope of existing federal power to pass binding laws."
Perhaps this hints that the Tenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution bars compulsion to disclose purely local
matters which are reserved to the states or to the people. 3
The use of committees by the Parliament dates certainly
from the 14th century, and was well established by the 16th
century. 4 The growth of the system parallels the growth of
Parliamentary privilege. In the 16th century the Parliament
assumed the work of judging the elections of its own members
through a committee of privilege, thus taking the judgment
of elections out of the royal courts. In the 17th century other
committees were provided in order to weaken the power of
the Speaker and of such Privy Councillors as might be
12 Maguire, Attack of the Common Lawyers on the Oath Ex Officio as Admin-
istered in the Ecclesiastical Courts in England in ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL
THEORY 199 (1936).
13 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 798 (3d ed. 1858). See also
Hamilton, The Inquisitorial Power of Congress, 23 A.B.A.J. 511, 513-14 (1937).
14 3 STUBBS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 484, 492 (5th ed. 1903).
LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
elected. 5 Today the Parliament uses the Committee of the
Whole House, standing committees, and select committees."
Only the select committees regularly call witnesses. Select
committees of the Parliament are more powerful than con-
gressional committees in the matter of compulsory disclosure,
since British witnesses have no "Fifth Amendment" which
would be enforced by a court of law to protect them
against self-incrimination. And the select committees issue no
minority reports. It is plain that they could bully and abuse
witnesses, but the fact is that they never do." Furthermore,
select committees do not have professional staffs to predigest
the material for them; such a practice would not fit the
British notion of the constitutional responsibility of the
Members. 8
For the sort of work usually done by an American investi-
gating committee the Parliament usually relies upon a Royal
Commission or a Tribunal of Inquiry. The Royal Commission
is an executive body appointed for the investigation. It has no
legal counsel, no publicly paid detectives, its witnesses appear
voluntarily, and it rarely has the power to compel testimony.
It relies on oral testimony, on staff research, and upon ques-
tionnaires. Royal Commissions place no witnesses in moral
dilemmas. 9 The closest American approximation would be a
presidential study-commission.
The Tribunal of Inquiry is used to investigate suspicion of
doing public harm "short of crime and criminal intent." Its
purpose is to have the study made by skilled minds who are
outside the arena of politics. A motion to establish a Tribunal
of Inquiry must pass both Houses. The Tribunal is usually
composed of distinguished judges and lawyers." Its work is
15 KEI, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN, 1485-1937, 150-51,
176 (1938).
10 Jennings, op. cit. supra note 8, at 264-79.
17 Finer, supra note 9, at 538-53.
18 Id. at 549-50 n.39.
19 Id. at 554-61.
20 Id. at 561-68.
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not to prosecute but to search for facts. It accepts evidence
which would not be accepted in court but it draws no conclu-
sions about the conduct of persons except from the kind of
evidence which is admissible in court.21
In its committee work the Parliament protects itself from
irresponsible Members by punishing for contempt any Mem-
ber who tells something which a committee wishes to keep
secret. Furthermore, according to the rules of the House of
Commons, the Speaker will rule out of order any Member
who tries to discuss a committee's work before the committee
reports to the House.22 It is plain that the theoretically un-
checked Parliament shows more self-restraint than the Con-
gress of the United States. Probably the best explanation of
this is that the work of the House of Commons is the con-
tinuous open investigation of the state of the realm by a body
of legislators which chooses the responsible executives from
its own majority.23 A study of British practices is therefore not
of much help in judging American practices by way of com-
parison.24 The American and British methods have common
roots, but the plants have grown in different directions since
the eighteenth century.
II
The Congress of the United States has probably conducted
about six hundred special investigations since 1792.25 Most
of the great American political issues are reflected in the
records of investigating committees.26 Although much of the
information the Congress actually uses comes from the work
21 Id. at 568-69.
22 Rogers, The Problem and Its Solution, 18 U. or Cr. L. REv. 464, 477 (1951).
23 Finer, supra note 9, at 522, 524.
24 Luce, The Committee System in the House of Representatives, (from his
CoNGREss, Ax ExPLANATi ON) in READINGS 3N AmmacAN GOVERNMENT 184 (Rankin
ed. 1939).
25 McGeary, Historical Development, 18 U. oF Cin. L. RV. 425, 426, 430, 432
(1951).
26 Galloway, The Investigative Function of Congress, 21 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 47,
48-9, 55 (1927).
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of sub-committees of the appropriations committees,27 such
standing committees have shown little interest in "penetrat-
ing investigations." 28 The motives for the typical special in-
vestigations are mixed. Some are for the scrutiny of the
executive branch, specifically arising out of the purse power.
Others are conducted to determine whether legislation is
needed. Some seek only to influence public opinion." Some-
times members have voted an investigation merely to gratify
a friend who wished to head an investigation. Investigations
are initiated to get revenge against personal enemies or un-
friendly governmental agencies. 0 A possible psychological
reason for the strong reliance on investigations is that most
people learn a subject more easily from oral testimony than
by reading staff research papers. Finally, it must be admitted
that the direction of a spectacular investigation has been for
some men the shortest road to glory, as we are reminded by
the names of Charles Evans Hughes, Hugo Black, Thomas E.
Dewey, Harry S. Truman, and Richard Nixon.
Early investigations were deliberately given to special
rather than to standing committees, partly because it was
thought that the standing committees might be too closely
related to the executive agencies which were most often the
subjects of investigation. 1 Examples of the earliest investiga-
tions were inquiries into the defeat, in 1792, of General
Arthur St. Clair's army by the Indians of Ohio, the investiga-
tion into Alexander Hamilton's financial affairs in the same
year, and the conduct of the Seminole War, in 1818.2
The Hamilton investigation was the first which discovered
anything disgraceful to the subject of an investigation. Its
27 Marx, Significance for the Administrative Process, 18 U. or Cm. L. Rlv. 503,
508 (1951).
28 Meader, Limitations on Congressional Investigations, 47 MCH. L. Rv. 775,
777, (1949).
29 McGeary, supra note 25, at 430.
30 Voorhis, Inner Workings, 18 U. or CHz. L. Rav. 455-57 (1951).
81 McGeary, supra note 25, at 431-32.
32 Dilliard, The Role of the Press, 18 U. or Cm. L. RFv. 585-86 (1951).
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procedure was strikingly different from the procedure of some
more recent committees which have found themselves in the
same position. It had been accidentally discovered that Sec-
retary of the Treasury Hamilton had been giving money to
a disreputable character for purposes unknown. There was a
suspicion that the man was acting as Hamilton's agent, and
was speculating in doubtful claims against the United States
on the basis of inside knowledge of Treasury affairs. Accord-
ingly, a joint Senate-House Committee of Three, the Speaker
of the House, a Senator, and a Representative, called on
Hamilton privately and at night. Hamilton "cleared himself"
- as it would be said today - by telling the Committee that
he was paying blackmail to the husband of a "friend." The
Committee kept the details of the sordid business to itself
and merely reported to the Congress that the suspicions of
speculation were groundless. They managed to keep the
secret for five years.3
Although there were many colonial precedents for punish-
ing contempt of a legislature, one of the first known congres-
sional punishments did not occur until 1812."- In 1821 the
Supreme Court refused to consider a presumption that the
House of Representatives might have acted improperly in
jailing a witness for contempt. 5 The absolute power of the
Congress to jail for contempt was supported again in 1848
when a court said it had no jurisdiction of the causes why the
Congress jailed for contempt. 6
33 BASSETT, THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 214-17 (1906); BRANT, JAMES MADISON,
FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 365-66 (1950) ; 5 HILDRETI, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 105-112 (Rev. ed. 1879).
34 Ehrmann, The Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation; A Com-
parative Study, 11 U. or Cm. L. REv. 1, 7n. 29 (1943). In 1800 William Duane,
editor of the Philadelphia Aurora, published details and a denunciation of a bill then
being considered by the Senate in closed session. He was summoned to the bar of the
Senate but refused to appear because, he claimed, no lawyer would appear as his
counsel because the Senate barred any effective defense. He was taken into custody
by the Sergeant at Arms but it does not appear that he was further punished by the
Senate. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM 199-202 (1951).
35 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U.S. 1821). See Comment, 26 TuLANE L.
REv. 381 (1952).
36 Ex parte Nugent, 18 Fed. Cas. 471, No. 10, 375 (C.C.D.C. 1848).
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The view of the federal courts has been that the power of
the Congress to punish for contempt is an implied common
law power." Until 1857 the Congress punished contempt by
bringing the offender to the bar of the House and there trying
him. If he was voted guilty the offended House ordered its
Sergeant at Arms to imprison him. In 1857 a law was enacted
to define contempt of the Congress, not so much to clarify it
as to make it a statutory offense which could be prosecuted
by the Department of Justice. 8 In that year the witness was
completely immunized from criminal prosecution,"9 with the
unhappy result that all the rascals in the government hastily
arranged to testify in return for pardon and absolution. An
amendment of 1862 limited the immunity to prohibiting the
use of the actual testimony. This is still the law." It does not
compel testimony but protects the witness from having his
actual words used against him, although it still leaves plenty
of room for prosecution on evidence discovered in leads from
his testimony.41
Doubts of the propriety of the behavior of the Congress
were stated very early. The Seventeenth Congress (1821-
1823) was criticized for using the investigative power to
collect campaign material.42 This has been a fairly continuous
complaint ever since. Until 1827 no committee was given
power to compel disclosures for legislative purposes, as dis-
37 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 225 (U.S. 1821). See Carr, The Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee and the Courts, 11 LA. L. REV. 282, 296 (1951).
38 REv. STAT. §§ 101-104 (1875) as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 191-194 (1946). See
Carr, supra note 37, at 296.
39 11 STAT. 155 (1857), repealed, 12 STAT. 333 (1862).
40 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. 1952). See Note [19531 WASH. U.L.Q. 313-16. The
1857 immunizing statute protected from criminal prosecution "... for any fact or
act touching which he shall be required to testify. . . ." The Supreme Court in-
validated a law, similar to the act of 1862, which gave a limited immunity in
judicial proceedings. The Court ruled that the act violated the Fifth Amendment,
because the immunity granted must be as broad as the privilege. Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
41 See Note [1953] WASH. U.L.Q. 313. But see, Smith, The Privilege of Silence
and the Legislative Process, 41 Gao. L.. 330 (1953).
42 Dilliard, supra note 32, at 585, citing Ives, In Place of Congressional "Cir-
cuses," N.Y. Times Mag., Aug. 27, 1950, p. 20.
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tinguished from scrutiny of the executive, or inquiry into
elections and qualifications of members. When the power to
compel disclosures for legislative purposes was granted to a
House committee in that year it only carried by a vote of 102
to 88 after a very warm debate. The Senate committees got
along without this "indispensable" power until 1859."3 In
1832 John Quincy Adams raised the question whether Con-
gress could rightly inquire into private political beliefs. 4
Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution said it would
be "truly alarming" if "the common law did not regulate,
interpret, and control the powers and duties of the court of
impeachment... . " As far as one can tell today there is no
way to guarantee that an impeachment trial would be a fair
trial, if the Congress chose to make it unfair.
Congressional investigations increased in numbers and
sensationalism in the years of the Grant administration. This
was partly because the subject matter was more sensational
than in most earlier investigations. But it was also partly due
to the great increase in newspaper circulation during the Civil
War years. The wide readership was maintained after the war
and furnished a market for sensational exposes and an admir-
ing national audience for aggressive investigators.46 The be-
havior of some investigators seems familiar. For example, the
behavior of Senator Ben Butler, as described by a contempor-
ary: 47
To imagine a genuine case of happiness, ... you must see
General Butler let loose upon several barrels of telegrams. He
is all activity. He has blank subpoenas, and sends for folks by
the wholesale. Being himself familiar with speculations, his
inquisitiveness is whetted to the sharpest edge.
43 McGeary, supra note 25, at 426-27.
44 Wyzanski, Standards for Congressional Investigations, 3 N.Y. Bar Assn. REc.
93 (1948).
45 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 798 (3d ed. 1858). See also
Hamilton, The Inquisitorial Power of Congress. 23 A.B.A.J. 511, 516 (1937).
46 Glassie and Cooley, Congressional Investigations - Salvation in Self-Regula-
tion, 38 GEo. L. J. 343, 345-46 (1950).
47 TowNsEND, WASHINGTON, OUTSIDE AND INSIDE 135-36 (1873), as quoted in
Glassie and Cooley, supra note 46, at 355.
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Investigators heard other criticism of their conduct. It was
charged in 1873 that one investigating committee was estab-
lished solely to provide a job for a friend of the chairman.48
But there was a popular demand for public hearings, as
opposed to closed hearings, as shown by a slogan used during
the presidential campaign of 1872, "Open doors! Less white-
wash and more fumigation!" "
The inquiries of the Grant period led directly into the first
and greatest setback that the congressional inquest has re-
ceived from the courts. That was the case of Kilbourn v.
Thompson."0 Kilbourn was a witness called to testify before
a committee which was investigating the failure of the bank-
ing firm of Jay Cooke and Company. He refused to answer a
question about a real estate partnership. When jailed for con-
tempt he sued the Sergeant at Arms of the House of Repre-
sentatives for false imprisonment. Two questions were con-
sidered: whether the Congress has a general power to punish
for contempt, and whether the Congress may inquire into
private affairs with no purpose except to expose. The Supreme
Court answered "no" to both questions. 1 Justice Miller, for
the Court, said the English Parliament had a general power
to punish for contempt because it was once a court, but the
United States Congress had never been a court. The House
could not invoke the Parliament's tradition to justify an in-
quiry into the private affairs of a citizen. Writing privately he
stated that courts and grand juries are the only inquisitions
into crime in this country, saying, "I do not recognize that
Congress is the grand inquest of the nation." 52 The Court
admitted a special power to punish for contempt in the case
of a witness at a hearing on the election of members, or their
qualifications, or on impeachment, since these inquiries are
48 Glassie and Cooley, supra note 46, at 353.
49 Id. at 362.
50 103 U.S. 168 (1881). See Gose, The Limits of Congressional Investigating
Power, 10 WAsH. L. Rxv. 61 (1935).
51 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189-90 (1881).
52 The "grand inquest" phrase was quoted by Dillard, supra note 32, at 585.
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expressly authorized in the Constitution."3 But as the Jay
Cooke investigation was not intended to produce legislation,
the question of compelling disclosures in aid of legislation was
not before the court." A critic of the Court's opinion has said
that the Congress can not be sure that it can or will not legis-
late until it investigates, and that the Supreme Court treated
the Congress as "an inferior tribunal in the judicial hier-
archy." 55
In the next few years several clarifications of the power of
compulsory disclosure were made by the courts. In a case
concerning the compelling of testimony before the Interstate
Commerce Commission it was ruled that the Fifth Amend-
ment did not protect from public disgrace but only protected
from criminal prosecution.56 This had no reference to the
Congress, of course, but lately the Fifth Amendment has come
under the close scrutiny of the Congress. In another case it
was held that the prosecution of congressional contempt cases
in the District of Columbia courts was not an unconstitutional
delegation of congressional power but only a supplement to
congressional power."7 It is deduced that a witness can be
punished for contempt at the bar of a house and also in
federal court for the same offense.55 These cases did not over-
rule Kilbourn v. Thompson because they were concerned with
investigations of public business, not private life.59
The Supreme Court placed one limit on the power of the
Congress to punish for contempt, and allowed one remedy for
an aggrieved witness or other private person, in Marshall v.
53 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1881).
54 Id. at 189, 194-95.
55 Morgan, Congressional Investigations and Judicial Review; Kilbourn v.
Thompson Revisited, 37 CALiF. L. REV. 557, 559, 574 (1949).
56 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 605-6 (1896). See Note [19531 WAsn. U.L.Q.
313, 316-17.
57 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897).
58 Id. at 672. See Carr, supra note 37, at 298.
59 Gose, supra note 50, at 74. In an unusual case, Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407,
419-20 (1908), the Court limited the power to compel testimony to investigations
which "concern a specific breach of the law." This is no longer binding. See Davis,
The Administrative Power of Investigations, 56 YALE L.J. 1111, 1112-13 (1947).
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Gordon," when it was ruled that there could be no punish-
ment for contempt if the behavior of the accused did not
obstruct the work of the Congress. In this case the House of
Representatives tried to punish the writer of a heated, ill-
tempered open letter to a committee which was inquiring into
the possibility of impeaching him.6 This is the only case since
1881 when a "judgment" of either House has been reversed
by a court of law.6" Its meaning seems to be that the safest
remedy available to one who feels abused by the Congress is
to call a press conference or to write a book.
An interesting development of methods of inquiry occurred
in New York state beginning in 1907 with the institution of
the "Moreland Commissioners" under the Moreland Act of
that year. The law provides for inquests somewhat in the
manner of the British Tribunal of Inquiry, to be conducted
by commissioners who are appointed by the Governor. The
inquiries carried on by the Moreland Commissioners have a
very respectable history.63
III
Although the congressional investigations of the period be-
fore the first World War occasionally aroused much popular
interest in the testimony they brought out, not much atten-
tion was paid to the investigative power as such until the
scandals of the Harding administration.6" Interest in the
power itself has been continuous since then.
60 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
61 Gose, supra note 50, at 74.
62 Morgan, supra note 55, at 559.
63 Rogers, supra note 22, at 471-72. Two cases which do not follow the main
line of judicial thought are of interest here. A Georgia court in Wallace v. Georgia
C. & N. Ry., 94 Ga. 732, 22 S.E. 579 (1894), held that freedom of speech includes
the freedom of silence. The other case, People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 64 N.E. 175
(1902), concerned the punishment of a publisher for publishing an article advising
all men to do their duty by murdering those who enforce the law. Unfortunately for
the publisher, the article appeared on the very day that President McKinley was
assassinated. The case is said to be the only one in American history where a court
punished a person for an opinion.
64 Rogers, supra note 22, at 464-65. Since the 1920's the Senate has conducted
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The key case in the Harding investigations was McGrain
v. Daugherty.5 Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Attorney
General Harry Daugherty, was twice subpoenaed by a Senate
committee but did not appear. The Sergeant at Arms was
sent after him. The matter came into federal court but, in the
end, the reluctant witness was told by the Supreme Court
that the Congress could compel his attendance. Justice Van
Devanter, for the Court, said, "We must assume . . . that
neither House will be disposed to exert the power beyond its
proper bounds, or without due regard to the rights of witness-
es." But if either house does exceed its limits the witness may
refuse to answer "where the bounds of the power are exceeded
or the questions are not pertinent to the matter under in-
quiry." " The only consolation here for the witness is that the
questions asked must be pertinent. This rule is not very help-
ful to a recalcitrant or abused witness." It requires that he
guess in advance that a federal court will later agree with him
that a particular question was impertinent."
The many investigations of the 1920's were conducted
vigorously. Witnesses and absent citizens were treated much
as they have been treated in recent years. Their treatment
was protested in familiar language. Calvin Coolidge, in a
message to the Senate in 1924, said the investigators were
capable of "unwarranted intrusion" which breaks down the
citizen's immunity against "unwarranted search and seizure."
more investigations than the House has. Rogers suggested that this-is so because of
the absence of cloture in the Senate, by which he meant that a Senate minority can
successfully insist on getting a special investigation. See McGeary, supra note 25, at
426.
65 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
66 Id. at 175-76.
67 Coudert, Congressional Inquisition vs. Individual Liberty, 15 VA. L. Rav. 537,
550 (1929). The first subpoena to Daugherty called for his records. It is worth
noting that the Congress is not required to use a sworn warrant in order to search
private papers. The oath of office taken by all Senators was enough to meet the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment for "oath or affirmation" supporting a war-
rant. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States 131-32 in 55 JoHNs HoPxiNs UNrvaaSrry SrTuiEs N
HisToRIcA.L AND POrxrCcA ScaENCE 341-42 (1937).
68 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
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The government, in effect, charges criminal action without
grand jury presentment, the rules of evidence for the protec-
tion of the innocent are ignored, "and instead of a government
of law we have a government of lawlessness." "
Newspapers attacked the investigators. The New York
Tribune called Senators Burton K. Wheeler and Thomas
Walsh "the Montana scandalmongers," the New York Post
said the investigators were "mudgunners," and the New York
Times referred to them as "assassins of character." Other
papers joined in: "Democratic lynching-bee," "poison-
tongued partisanship, pure malice, and twittering hysteria,"
"in plain words, contemptible and disgusting." "
J. H. Wigmore, the great authority on the law of evidence,
said the Teapot Dome inquiry should have used "the con-
stitutional, manly, fair procedure of impeachment" but "flung
self-respect and fairness to the winds"' and "fell rather in
popular estimate to the level of professional searchers of the
municipal dunghills."
One critic, a professional super-patriot, Fred R. Marvin,
probably overstated the case but used the stereotypes of the
1950's in a curious way when he said the investigations of the
oil scandals were the result of "a gigantic international con-
spiracy . . , of the internationalists, or shall we call them
socialists and communists?" 72
Angered by the aggressive, prosecution-minded investiga-
tions, Attorney General Daugherty unsuccessfully tried to
work up a case by which the Department of Justice could
prosecute Senator Burton K. Wheeler for some as. yet un-
69 Quoted in Galloway, Proposed Reforms, 18 U. op Cni. L. REv. 478, 479 n.2
(1951).
70 ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY 178 (Bantam ed. 1946).
71 Wigmore, Comment, Evidence - Legislative Power to Compel Testimonial
Disclosure, 19 ILL. L. REv. 452, 453 (1925). This critic, in 1929, thought that abuses
could be curbed only by invoking congressional self-respect, and securing a higher
standard of membership. In short, the problem was political, not legal. Coudert,
supra note 67, at 551.
72 ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 178-79.
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discovered crime. Other Senators complained that Depart-
ment of Justice agents tried to blackmail them in the hope of
keeping them quiet.73
The American Civil Liberties Union and the Washington
Post asked that cross-examination of witnesses be allowed.
Bills for that purpose were introduced in the Congress but
died. A usual argument against allowing cross-examination of
witnesses at congressional hearings was that the committee
were always pressed for time and cross-examination would
delay their work.74
There were supporters of the way the investigations were
conducted. Felix Frankfurter wrote an article which appeared
in the New Republic in 1924 entitled "Hands Off the Investi-
gations," in which he said those who suggest "restrictions on
the procedure of future congressional investigations" do so to
"divert attention and shackle the future." '5
George B. Galloway, in the American Political Science
Review76 in 1927 listed the merits and defects of the con-
gressional inquests as he saw them. Neither the abuse of wit-
nesses nor the defamation of absent citizens was listed as a
defect. He thought the damage done by violation of privacy
was ". .. inconsiderable compared to the evils that would
result from depriving Congress of the power . . ." and he
warned against taking "a narrow legalistic attitude." "7 Be-
cause the power protects from the arbitrary action of sub-
ordinate officials it "safeguards the rights of individuals from
flagrant violation." "' He admitted that "... the itch for
73 WIsH, CONTEMPORARY AmFRCA 366 (1945).
74 Glassie and Cooley, supra note 46, at 356-58.
75 38 NEW REPuBLIC 329 (May 21, 1924). See Boudin, Congressional and
Agency Investigations: Their Uses and Abuses, 35 VA. L. REv. 143, 146 (1949).
Boudin, who once feared judicial power, now hoped for judicial protection of wit-
nesses. Regarding Frankfurter's position, it is only fair to add that he joined in the
call for cross-examination of committee witnesses.
76 Galloway, The Investigative Function of Congress, 21 Am. POL. SCI. REv. 47,
66-69 (1927).
77 Id. at 58.
78 Id. at 65.
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power and partisan malice.. ." have motivated congressional
investigations but they have also been ... a salutary force
in the direction of good government.. . , It is worth noting
that Mr. Galloway, twenty-four years later, wrote an article
calling for reform of the procedures of congressional investi-
gating committees.8"
The mood of the defenders of the committees was perhaps
best represented in the words of James M. Landis, who said,
"The bar of privacy ... would make only the most super-
ficial of examinations possible [and] require of senators that
they be seers." 81 It can be added that the "Rule of Impertin-
ence" of McGrain v. Daugherty required that witnesses be
seers.
Samuel Seabury thought the immunity against compulsory
self-incrimination ".... should be made inapplicable to cases
where the subversion of the very processes of government is
involved.... ." 82 By "subversion" he meant bribery, but his
rule would be very convenient for some investigators today.
It is plain that the so-called "liberal" and "conservative"
positions on this question today were completely reversed in
the 19201s. It can be said that the effective work of under-
mining Kilbourn v. Thompson was done by the "liberals." 83
The Prophet Osee had a phrase for them - "For they shall
sow wind and reap a whirlwind."
IV
A shift in the purpose of investigation by the Congress was
shown in the first two Congresses of the New Deal years.
79 Id. at 55-56.
80 Galloway, Proposed Reforms, 18 U. op Ci. L. REv. 478 (1951).
81 Landis, supra note 6, at 220-21.
82 Seabury, The Legislative Investigating Committee: Foreword, 33 COL. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1933).
83 Boudin, supra note 75, passim. The most thorough study of the matter in the
1920's was that of Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74
U. OF PA. L. REV. 691, 780 (1926). After reviewing practically all of the relevant
cases he concluded, "Public policy would seem to require that only in the clearest
cases of want of jurisdiction and of oppression should the courts interfere with legis-
lative investigations." Id. at 829.
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Earlier inquiries had mostly been aimed at checking or em-
barrassing an administration. Such investigations were often
used to gain political advantage with the voters. In the 1930's
investigations were often used to aid the administration.
Several important and famous investigations were carefully
timed to support the legislative proposals of President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt. Famous investigations preceded the enact-
ment of famous New Deal statutes. On one occasion "the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce conducted an
inquiry" into railway financing "partly for the purpose of
acquiring information which the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission felt it did not have the power to obtain." 84
When lobbyists opposed New Deal bills concerning holding
companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Congress
blunted the lobbyists' weapons by investigating lobbies.
When the Townsend movement loomed large, a committee
tried to discredit Dr. Francis Townsend.85 The power to
punish for contempt of the Congress was defined by the
Supreme Court as including the power to punish for past con-
tempt, not merely for current obstruction of the legislative
process.86 An amendment allowed the Vice President or the
Speaker to certify witnesses for contempt when the Congress
was not in session." In 1935 there was a finding of contempt
of the Senate at the bar of the Senate, without resort to the
executive prosecution of statutory contempt.88
84 McGeary, supra note 25, at 430-31.
85 McGeary, Congressional Investigations During Franklin D. Roosevelt's First
Term, 31 Ams. PoL. Sci. REv. 682, 683, 691, 694 (1937). The administrative agencies
also saw their powers expanded. Subpoenas were allowed for any lawful purpose and
fishing expeditions were now lawful. Intrastate activities were investigated. Courts
enforced subpoenas without requiring the agencies to show "probable cause" or
"probable jurisdiction." Business facts were not protected by the guarantees against
unreasonable search and seizure. Davis, supra note 59, at 1153-54.
86 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935), was the case involving "past
contempt." The defendant was punished for the destruction of papers in his filds
after he received a subpoena. The punishment in no way furthered the investigation
by the Congress.
87 REv. STAT. 104 (1875), as amended, 49 STAT. 2041 (1936), 2 U.S.C. 194 (1946).
88 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935). See Carr, supra note 37, at 298.
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The attitude toward witnesses, as in the 1920's, was often
closer to prosecution than to simple interrogation. In 1936
Senator Hugo Black expressed a typical congressional view in
an article on investigations. He assumed that a non-coopera-
tive witness had something to hide. Committees, he said,
"... have always been opposed by groups that seek or have
special privileges ... special privilege thrives in secrecy and
darkness and is destroyed by rays of pitiless publicity." 89 The
criticism of the methods of the investigating committees was
the same sort of criticism and from the same sort of people
as in the 1920's. Governor Alfred Landon, speaking in Octo-
ber, 1936, attacked "a committee that is out to get the critics"
as opposed to "a committee that is out to get the crooks."
This, it will be agreed, has a familiar ring.
The decade of the 1930's was a turning point. Since then a
profound concern has been shown regarding the conflict of
investigative power and constitutional right. Three major
questions have been asked. Does the First Amendment pre-
vent inquiry into belief and opinion? Does the searches and
seizures clause of the Fourth Amendment limit the subpoena
power? What immunity from self-incrimination does the
Fifth Amendment give the witness before a congressional
committee? 9" True, a few people in the 1920's had raised
these questions but only sporadically. Before the 1940's the
weightiest adverse criticisms had been that the investigations
were used against the executive branch for partisan and per-
sonal ends, and that the committees were inefficient and in-
competent at finding facts. Since the late 1930's the critics
have concentrated on the invasions of personal liberty by in-
vestigators. The later critics charge that an investigation
89 Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, 172 HARPERs 275, 286 (Feb. 1936).
90 MeGeary, Congressional Investigations During Franklin D. Roosevelt's First
Term, 31 A.m. Pot.. Sex. REv. 680 n.1 (1937).
91 Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Punish Con-
tempts of Its Investigating Committees, 38 VA. L. REv. 887-88 (1952).
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often assumes the aspects of a trial without the safeguards
which a trial gives to the innocent,92 or to the guilty, for that
matter.
The cause of the switch in interest is easy to find. The
most publicized of recent investigating committees have
turned from economic to political questions. The sign at the
fork of the road was the establishment of the House Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities in 193 8. The mission of this
Committee was so broad as to amount to this: to investigate
all political propaganda. It is in this area that one must be
very watchful for violations of the First Amendment.93
In carrying out its assignment the Un-American Activities
Committee has inquired into many things. Among them are:
opposition to the American system of checks and balances,
opposition to the Franco government of Spain, the advocacy
of a world state, the advocacy of the dissolution of the British
empire, and disagreement with the views of General Mac-
Arthur. Apparently its subject matter concerns any change
anywhere in the status quo.9"
The Un-American Activities Committee has shown a
curiously methodical bias in its treatment of witnesses. The
Committee distinguishes between friendly and hostile wit-
nesses. Friendly witnesses are allowed to tell their stories in
their own way, prompted by considerately phrased questions.
Hostile witnesses are often forbidden to make statements
except as answers to questions. The examination of hostile
witnesses is vigorous and penetrating, except when the Com-
mittee is unable to prevent its own members from asking
irrational or prejudiced questions. At its most effective, com-
92 Galloway, Proposed Reforms, 18 U. OF Cm5. L. REV. 478, 480 (1951). As late
as 1938 a standard work on elementary political science considered the chief ques-
tion concerning the conduct of investigating committees to be the question whether
they hindered the executive branch. OGG AND RAY, INTRODUCTION TO AmERiCAN
GOVERNMENT 408 n.35, 457 n.10 (6th ed. 1938).
93 Driver, supra note 91, at 888-89.
94 See Note, 43 ILL. L. REV. 253, 255 n.20 (1948).
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mittee examination sounds like a capable cross-examination
in a criminal trial, rather than a search to find information
which would be useful in legislating. At its worst, the Commit-
tee has shown inefficiency, even when on the right track in a
line of questioning. It has often resented the presence of
counsel brought by witnesses. It does not allow cross-examin-
ation. It usually refuses to allow a reply by any person named
in its testimony as "Un-American." 
95
This Committee has been the committee most scrutinized
in the courts. Since 1945 it has been in continuous conflict
with witnesses but there has not been a single adverse court
ruling on the Committee's work and methods. It is one thing
for a court to review a statute - it is quite another to review
the methods of legislation. Courts have shown an under-
standable reluctance to go into the matter. 6 Witnesses have
tried to avoid testimony because of the impertinence of the
questions, or because of the danger of self-incrimination, or
because of the prejudicial manner in which the hearings are
conducted." As will be shown, only the "self-incrimination"
plea has been successful.
Since 1945 the Committee has been a standing committee.
Although it is a legislative committee it has had very little to
do with legislation. It did part of the work on the Mundt-
Nixon Bill and wrote part of the McCarran Internal Security
Act, and that is all of its direct legislative influence in fifteen
years of operation. In reality it is not so much a legislative
committee as it is a detective agency. Congressman Rankin
has preferred to call it "the grand jury of America." It has,
in a manner of speaking, "indicted" or "cleared" suspects. Its
members have loosely referred to themselves as a "court." "
95 Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee, 18 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 598, 611
et seq. (1951).
96 Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee and the Courts, 11 LA. L. REv.
282,283 (1951).
97 See Comment, 26 Tw"E L. REV. 381, 382 (1952).
98 Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee, 18 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 598-610
(1951).
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The temper of this Committee in dealing with a hostile
witness was shown by a Chairman, J. Parnell Thomas, in
November, 1948, when he told a witness, "The rights you have
are the rights given you by this committee. We will determine
what rights you have got and what rights you have not got
before this committee." " For practical purposes, Mr.
Thomas's view is historically correct.
The possibility of congressional self-restraint appeared
briefly in 1946 when the Legislative Reorganization Act of
that year passed the Senate with the proviso that there be no
select investigating committees, but that clause was taken out
by the House of Representatives. In the next Congress (the
eightieth) there were forty-six legislative inquiries, six of
them by select committees.0
Whether the courts could reform the treatment of witnesses
before congressional investigating committees.0 ' will be treat-
ed by other members of this symposium. However, it may be
noted here that the only strong agreement with a reluctant
witness stated by a judge within the time limits of this paper
was a dissenting opinion..2 of Justice Edgerton of the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. He wisely based his
dissent on logical, not historical grounds. He said that the
Un-American Activities Committee violates the right of free
speech: "The privilege of choosing between speech that
means ostracism and speech that means perjury is not free-
dom of speech."'0 3 Again:' "The First Amendment forbids
Congress purposely to burden forms of expression that it may
not punish." "Congressional action that is either intended
99 As quoted in Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 97 (1949).
100 McGeary, Historical Development, 18 U. oF Cm. L. Rav. 425, 432 (1951).
101 See Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee and the Courts, 11 LA. L.
RFv. 282, 296-99 (1951).
102 Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
843 (1948).
103 Id. at 254.
104 Id. at 256.
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or likely to restrict expression of opinion that Congress may
not prohibit violates the First Amendment." .05
V
The power to compel disclosures is not an expressed but an
implied power.' 6 On this matter there have been two con-
flicting traditions in American thinking. It has been contended
that the Congress is the grand inquest of the nation with
necessarily broad powers of compulsory disclosure. Converse-
ly it has been said that the Congress is not a national inquest,
and that only courts and grand juries inquire into crimes in
this country. The first view has persevered and triumphed.
Certainly the Congress does have the character of a court, e.g.
impeachment, judgment of the elections and qualifications of
its members. Whether it has the character of a court in other
matters is the disputed point.
To justify the broad power to compel disclosures it is said
that the complexity of the state has increased almost beyond
the power of Congressmen to know. The executive has a very
large staff. The legislature has a very small staff. The execu-
tive suggests legislation and the legislature enacts law in very
loose terms, leaving the executive to fill in the details at dis-
cretion. It is claimed that this is not true legislation.' 7 To
make the legislature more responsive and more responsible
the Congress increasingly turns to the use of special legislative
committees to search for information. The need may be grave,
but it is certainly questionable whether the need for informa-
tion by an understaffed official body can be used to excuse
defamation and verbal injury.
Courts have accepted the principle that the power to com-
pel disclosure may be used to gather facts for legislation, but
105 Id. at 259.
106 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927). See Gose, supra note go,
at 63.
107 Meader, Importance of the Fact Finding Process, 18 U. or CErr. L. REV. 449
(1951).
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have said that the questions must be pertinent. The final
determination of pertinency will be made by a court, not by
the witness, which makes it a very risky defense. If the ques-
tion is ruled to be pertinent, the witness will be punished for
contempt." 8 The practical effect of the use of the-power to
compel disclosures in recent years has been to allow "intru-
sions into private belief by giving a blanket endorsement to
inquiries into the political faiths of all men." ' At the same
time the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against un-
reasonable search and seizure has been narrowed by defini-
tion which allows "fishing expeditions" in the records of
political organizations."' There being no other protection of
political privacy witnesses have taken to refusing to answer
questions on the ground of the Fifth Amendment, that is, that
an answer would incriminate. This has become the only real
limit on the power to compel disclosures."' It seems very
likely that some witnesses have abused this right, not to pre-
vent criminal prosecution but to protect political privacy or
to avoid telling of the eccentric or unconventional (but not
criminal) behavior of their best friends.
Today, of all officialdom, only a legislative committee can
set up an arbitrary standard of orthodoxy and compel a
citizen to tell whether he accepts it. It may be that private
persons have no right to political privacy but this right has a
respectable tradition of protection, since every state provides
for secret balloting in general elections."'
The invariable punishment of a defiant witness is imprison-
ment for contempt. The power to punish for contempt has
108 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929) ; McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927). See Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee ahd the
Courts, 11 LA. L. REv. 282, 287-88 (1951).
109 Driver, supra note 91, at- 898.
110 Id. at 898-902.
III Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee and the Courts, 11 LA. L. Rv.
282, 290-95 (1951).
112 Nutting, Freedom of Silence: Constitutional Protection Against Govern-
mental Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 MxcH. L. REv. 181 (1948).
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been used against almost no other kind of offender for more
than a century."3 Such contempt cases may be prosecuted in
federal courts or tried at the bar of the House, at the dis-
cretion of the Congress." 4 If the contempt obstructs or has
obstructed the work of the Congress it is punishable,"' but
there is no limit on contemptuous publication or speech which
does not obstruct the work of the Congress."'
VI
Of equal importance to this discussion is the immunity of
the legislator from being questioned elsewhere for words
spoken in relation to legislation. This immunity, like the
power to compel disclosures, is part of our heritage of English
law and custom.
The modern British ruling on the independence of Parlia-
ment is that "What is said or done within the walls of
Parliament cannot be enquired into in a court of law." This
represents a victory for which Parliament contended for cen-
turies."7
There were half a dozen famous medieval cases of arrests
of Members, but no medieval remedy except to petition the
King. (There is no record of conflicts between Members and
non-Members, over words spoken in the Parliament.) The
original immunity of Members of Parliament came as a grant
from the King at the opening of each Parliament - granted,
very likely, to make service in the Parliament attractive to
113 Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee and the Courts, 11 LA. L. Rv.
282, 296-97 (1951).
114 Id. at 298-99.
115 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 148 (1935). See Ford, The Lawyer and
the Congressional Investigation, 21 So. CALIF. L. REV. 259 (1948).
116 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
117 Bradlaugh v. Gossett, 12 Q.B.D. 271 (1884). See McLwAmn, THE HIoH
COURT or PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREmACy 165 (1910).
An example of an early claim to such a position occurred in the reign of
Richard II when the House of Lords of the "Merciless Parliament" tried several of
the King's cronies for treason. The House insisted that the matter was too important
to be bound by the rules of law and that the Parliament was the supreme judge of
law. 2 STUBBs, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY or ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGIN AND
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the Members.11 The King could protect himself from the
abuse of the privilege by dissolving the Parliament and call-
ing a new one. A partial equivalent protection in the United
States today is the constitutional requirement of periodic
elections to the Congress. In England the last direct violation
of Parliamentary immunity was in Elliot's case in 1630,19
when several members were convicted of seditious utterance.
The mills of the law ground slowly but surely - thirty-seven
years later, on writ of error, the House of Lords reversed the
lower court. The immunity was written into the English Bill
of Rights in 1689 and has not been attacked since. 2 ' From
this source it came into the United States Constitution. In a
manner of speaking, Congressional immunity has no legal
history since it is beyond the reach of the law. It has been
justified on the ground that the legislature needs absolute
freedom of speech to do its work. It is not intended for the
personal benefit of the legislator but exists to protect the
interest of the citizen in good legislation. Of course, to tell
lies on the floor of the Congress does not promote the interest
of the citizen but the loss of the privilege would, it is argued,
paralyze the legislature.' Therefore there is an absolute
privilege of members of the Congress (and state legislators)
DEVELOPMENT 503 (4th ed. 1906). The personal vindictiveness which such a rule
encouraged was shown by the many bills of attainder which followed periods of
political excitement. It will be remembered that the United States Congress passed a
bill of attainder less than ten years ago. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303
(1946).
It is not irrelevant to note that treason has always been "an offence more
political than criminal" and that it has been almost impossible to have nonpartisan
inquiries into treason. The tendency, through the centuries, has been for the concept
of treason to broaden. Rezneck, The Trial of Treason in Tudor England in ESSAYS
I HIsToRy AND POLITICAL THEORY 258 (1936). Mr. Mcllwain once remarked to
this writer that almost every defendant charged with treason, in all of English
history, has been convicted.
118 3 STuBs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 488 (5th ed. 1903).
119 Rex v. Elliott, 5 Cro. Car. 181, 79 Eng. Rep. 759 (K.B. 1630), rev'd, 16 Cro.
Car. 605, 79 Eng. Rep. 1121 (H.L. 1667).
120 Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M. c.2. Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defama-
tion: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 COL. L. REv. 131, 133-34 (1910).
The author listed sixteen nations which guaranteed legislative immunity from being
questioned elsewhere. The list has shortened since then.
121 Note, 3 STAx. L. REv. 486, 489-90 (1951).
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to inflict verbal injury, so long as the words they use are
related, however remotely, to legislation.'22 The immunity
extends even to performances which are contrary to the rules
of the House in which the words are spoken.'23 Serious and
respected critics have recently been concerned to see this
immunity used to establish in our jurisprudence the doctrine
of guilt by imputation, or more popularly, "guilt by associa-
tion." 124
Woodrow Wilson, almost seventy years ago, pointed out
that defamation and public disgrace protected by congression-
al immunity were also very inefficient tools of legislation. The
Congress, he said, can not control the executive officers except
by "disgracing them." This method requires "openly avowing
a suspicion of malfeasance," after which the speaker "must
then magnify and intensify the scandal. . . ." Usually this
leads to no action whatsoever.'25
The process has become stereotyped. It has created a
political rhetoric of acrimony. The strong, violent language
of animosity has been developed steadily since the first years
of the republic, until politicians use it as heedlessly as soldiers
use profanity. It has been suggested that the crude animosity
shown toward witness before the Congress stems from several
psychological roots. The legislator has lost a degree of
influence in the executive branch with the loss of patronage
because of the expansion of the merit system. The harshness
of the congressional investigator springs partly from this
frustration. His manner is not sweetened when he detects an
air of superiority in an administrator or scholar who has
superior knowledge. There is also an old distrust of intellect-
uals in American politics, found in the first Federalist admin-
122 Id. at 486-87; Veeder, supra note 120, at 134-37.
123 Veeder, supra note 120, at 136.
124 O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 HARv. L. REv. 592, 604
(1948).
125 Quoted in Galloway, Proposed Reforms, 18 U. op Cmn. L. lav. 478, 479 n.2
(1951).
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istrations as well in those quarters where the noun "Egghead"
is good usage. It was most fairly put by Roscoe Conkling
when he described the Liberal Republicans of 1872 as "ideal-
ists and professors and soreheads." 126 The strong Calvinist
strain in our American morality has the unhappy effect of
making some of us very self-righteous. Self-righteousness,
allied with the tradition of lawlessness which has caused two
thousand lynchings in the past seventy years, makes it easy to
arrange for an "intellectual lynching" behind the safeguard
of congressional immunity.
Congressional immunity is a mighty fortress. Indeed, a
Congressman must go to a good deal of trouble to expose
himself. The only way he can leave himself open is maliciously
to repeat outside - that is, in a way totally unrelated to
legislation - what was privileged slander when said in rela-
tion to the process of legislation." 7 The only sure remedy for
abuse of congressional immunity is for the Congress to dis-
cipline its own members. With the possible exception of the
case of Theodore Bilbo, it is unknown for the Congress to
punish a member for words which injure a non-member. Thus
the only sure remedy is the one which is never used. A very
improbable remedy was attempted in 1906 when the Senate
accepted a petition to expel a member, but the petition died
in committee." 8
Thus it turns out that legislative immunity, first instituted
to protect Members of Parliament from kings and their
judges, now serves equally to protect the defamation of pri-
vate citizens. As Hamilton said, "The representatives of the
people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that
they are the people themselves, and betray strong symptoms
126 Shils, supra note 11, at 578-80. Conkling's words are quoted in JosapusoN,
THE POLITICoS, 1865-1896 163 (1938).
127 Note, 18 U. or Cnt. L. REV. 591 (1951), considers at some length the priv-
ilege of publishing congressional defamation.
128 Note, 3 STAws. L. Rav. 486, 492 (1951).
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of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from
any other quarter. . . ." ' Today the impatience and disgust
is often caused by the opposition of private persons.
VII
In this short sketch of the origins and progressive clarifica-
tion of the ideas of legislative inquiry and legislative immun-
ity it can be seen that we are dealing with ideas which have
become steadily more precise over a period of ten centuries.
New ages raised new questions. New questions brought new
clarifications. It is hoped that this discussion may have some
part in bringing about further definition to meet the problems
of our own time. The data of the past suggest several general-
izations which might be of use in resolving this generation's
uncertainties:
(1) Congressional investigations have never been separ-
ated from the heat of politics. They are so often politically
motivated that it might clarify our thinking if we accept them
frankly as "the legitimate function and duty of a political
party. 130
(2) Reform of the treatment of witnesses is needed. It
can be done jointly by "liberals" and "conservatives." They
have so often been on both sides of this question that there is
no permanent line separating them.
(3) It might be honestly questioned whether the legisla-
tor needs as much protection from the private citizen as he
needed against, say, Queen Elizabeth I or King Charles I.
(4) Courts have shown an unwillingness "to interfere
with inquiries in any way." "'
129 THE FEDERAIisT, No. 71 at 466 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
130 Galloway, The Investigative Function of Congress, 21 Am. PoL. Sci. REv.
47,58 (1927).
131 McGeary, Historical Development, 18 U. or CHx. L. Rav. 425, 434, 435
(1951).
